Thank you very much to Harvard Law School, the Program on International Financial Systems, the China Development Research Foundation, and Professor Hal Scott for inviting me to speak. I’m honored to join this week’s symposium.
My remarks will focus on one element of the evolving U.S.-China relationship, the Financial Working Group co-chaired by the U.S. Treasury and People’s Bank of China, and the important progress that group has made in the last year. But first, I will provide some background on the nearly two-year-long efforts towards improving bilateral communication and engagement on U.S.-China economic and financial issues.
Background
When President Biden met President Xi in Bali in November 2022, he emphasized that the US and China must manage our competition responsibly and that such competition should not veer into conflict. Both sides agreed to empower key senior officials to enhance communication on the macroeconomy and cooperation on issues like climate change and debt distress.[1]
Secretary Yellen has since laid out a roadmap for future Treasury engagement with China, following this vision and involving three principal objectives.[2]
- First, the United States will secure its national security interests and those of its allies and partners, and the United States will protect human rights.
- Second, the United States seeks a healthy economic relationship with Chinathat provides a level playing field for firms and workers in both countries.
- Third, the United States and China have a pressing responsibility to tackle the urgent global challenges of our day—including the key items of macroeconomic stability, climate change, and debt distress laid out by President Biden and President Xi in Bali.
Last July, Secretary Yellen took her first official trip to Beijing as Treasury Secretary, and had productive talks with senior Chinese officials on opportunities and challenges in the U.S.-China relationship. She noted the importance of frank and in-depth discussions, especially on areas where there is disagreement, because it gives each side a better understanding of the other’s actions and intentions. Following these talks, she noted her hope that the U.S. and China could move to “a phase in our relationship where senior-level diplomacy is simply taken as a natural element of managing one of the world’s most consequential bilateral relationships.”[3]
During the trip, Secretary Yellen and Vice Premier He Lifeng also agreed that their teams should have more structured and consistent communication between these high-level meetings.[4] That fall, they established two bilateral mechanisms for such communication: an Economic Working Group (EWG) and a Financial Working Group (FWG). Since then, these two groups have worked in parallel to advance the objectives set by President Biden and Secretary Yellen.
Rationale for Engagement on Financial Policy Issues
Shortly after the Secretary’s trip, at another PIFS symposium last September, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Finance Brent Neiman explained the rationale for the creation of these working groups.[5] Since then, the FWG has met four times, with additional technical meetings in between each session. I’ve had the opportunity to join each of those sessions, and to develop the group’s agenda with colleagues from across Treasury and the U.S. government. That experience has clarified that regular, frank engagement between U.S. and Chinese financial authorities is valuable for promoting mutual understanding.
A strong, well-functioning financial system is a public good.[6] Its benefits accrue to all, because stable, resilient, well-functioning, and efficient markets contribute to stronger, more durable economic growth. Its maintenance requires contributions by all, because risks in one country and corner of the global financial system can travel, quickly and unexpectedly, to many others.
Maintaining a public good —in this case, keeping the financial playing field stable, level, and safe—requires ongoing and active coordination. In normal times, cooperation helps identify and address vulnerabilities as they emerge. In crisis, it helps contain stress and restore calm. In both contexts, cooperation requires both technical engagement and political accountability and support; it requires the hard work of identifying and understanding risks, and the equally hard work of marshaling support to address them. Without either one, problems tend to grow faster; to spread to other parts of the financial system; and to become harder and costlier to solve.
For this reason, the United States has an interest in international financial stability, and U.S. authorities engage actively to advance that interest. This includes our membership and participation in multilateral groups, many of which China is also a member, like the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which the G20 created after the Global Financial Crisis to better address systemic risk. However, for large, interconnected economies, bilateral engagement is an essential complement to multilateral engagement. It lets us better understand each other’s policies, discuss their cross-border implications, and identify areas of mutual interest and concern. Importantly, it has value even when agreement is lacking or communication is halting, because it lets each party convey information about its positions and its priorities.
Above all, bilateral dialogue is an investment in navigating international financial crises. Such crises are—to put it mildly—a bad time to meet new people and try new things. They are moments when the actions of financial authorities become relevant to a much wider range of people, organizations, and jurisdictions. They broaden the scope, and raise the stakes, of ongoing, immediate, and clear communication. Navigating them requires strong working links between finance ministries, central banks, resolution authorities, and supervisors and regulators. Those, in turn, take repeated, concerted, and early engagement, with the goal of spotting and working through challenges ahead of time. The goal—always, and at best, a work in progress—is that “we know our counterparts, we know their system, they know ours,” and “if something were to go wrong, we know who to call.”[7]
Treasury has long held regular financial dialogues with other jurisdictions. Given the stakes, it’s natural for us to also hold one with China. The U.S. and China are two of the largest economies in the world. Together, we account for some 40% of global banking assets, and we are the home authority to twelve of the world’s thirty global systemically important banks.[8] The domestic financial stability of the U.S. and China has significant implications for global financial stability, and our policies have an outsized effect on how financial risks evolve globally. Working directly with our Chinese counterparts can help advance many of Treasury’s priorities, including our financial stability objective, our climate goals, and the effectiveness of our global efforts to combat money laundering and illicit finance. This is true even when our views on those priorities diverge.